Working Papers
Information Manipulation & Agency Problems in Autocratic Hierarchies.
Most scholarship of information manipulation simply assume that autocrats can set programs for information manipulation without intermediaries. This is notably the case in Bayesian persuasion frameworks---a standard approach to formalize information manipulation. Other literature suggests that agency problems greatly complicate program implementation, thus shedding doubt on the credible commitment assumption in those frameworks. It suggests that autocrats can credibly commit to manipulate information with fixed frequencies, even though they could gain more from defection. We integrate agency problems into a Bayesian persuasion framework with a focus on intimidation and self-censorship. In this framework, a credible commitment to information manipulation endogenously emerges from the optimal choices of an autocrat’s repressive agents and regime critics. Counterintuitively, agency problems in an autocratic hierarchy leave an autocrat better off. Our framework improves our understanding of how autocrats manipulate information and makes a methodological contribution to the formal literature of Bayesian persuasion.
Purges & Reputation.
Elite purges in dictatorships are argued to serve the purpose of prevention. We develop a formal model to show that a purge additionally improves a dictator’s reputation for invincibility. It always leaves potential future conspirators more deterred than they would have been, had they not witnessed any purge. Some dictators fake conspiracies to create pretexts for these two reasons. Others foster regime cohesion and only purge as a last resort. Whether a dictator invests in his reputation for invincibility or upholds regime cohesion depends on both his information and threat environment. Broadly speaking, if the internal threat of a coup dominates, fake conspiracies occur. If the external threat of a revolution or civil war is significantly dominant, however, dictators prefer regime cohesion. These insights help us better understand why and when dictators purge, acknowledge or even fake firm opposition, and trade cohesion for reputation.
War against Democracy: Shared Identity, Democratization, & International Conflict.
In preparation.
Question Times, Service Requests, & Party Brands in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Zimbabwe.
In preparation.
Question Times & Protests in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Zimbabwe.
In preparation.
Political Parties as Democratic Check.
In preparation.
Shaping Identities to Undermine Democracy.
In preparation.