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Felix Dwinger

Felix DwingerFelix DwingerFelix Dwinger

Welcome!

Welcome!Welcome!

Working Papers

Rooted in Repression: A Theory of Propaganda.

What is propaganda’s relationship with repression? We examine this question using a formal model. It builds upon two premises. First, repressive agents have private interests affecting their intimidation and repression efforts. Second, propaganda is about competence claims, and autocrats can use its composition to shape government competence. Two forms of propaganda emerge endogenously from our setup, depending on the stakes of repressive agents in an autocrat’s political survival. Repressive agents with high stakes signal strong resolve to suppress any rebellion through significant intimidation efforts. It induces citizens to obey while competence claims burst into absurdity---a form of propaganda called domination. In contrast, autocrats must resort to persuasion---credible competence claims---if intimidation is absent due to low stakes of repressive agents. Our framework clarifies the conditions under which domination and persuasion each substitute or complement repression. We also show how propaganda operates when talk is cheap. 

Purges & Reputation.

Elite purges in dictatorships are argued to serve the purpose of prevention. We develop a formal model to show that a purge additionally improves a dictator’s reputation for invincibility. It always leaves potential future conspirators more deterred than they would have been, had they not witnessed any purge. Some dictators fake conspiracies to create pretexts for these two reasons. Others foster regime cohesion and only purge as a last resort. Whether a dictator invests in his reputation for invincibility or upholds regime cohesion depends on both his information and threat environment. Broadly speaking, if the internal threat of a coup dominates, fake conspiracies occur. If the external threat of a revolution or civil war is significantly dominant, however, dictators prefer regime cohesion. These insights help us better understand why and when dictators purge, acknowledge or even fake firm opposition, and trade cohesion for reputation.

Service Upon Request? Evidence from Question Times in Zimbabwe.

In preparation.

War against Democracy: Shared Identity, Democratization, & International Conflict.

In preparation.

Political Parties as Democratic Check.

In preparation.

Shaping Identities to Undermine Democracy.

In preparation.


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